By Adam Starzynski, a journalist and foreign policy analyst specializing in military affairs and security issues
After three years of Sudan’s civil war, NGOs and the international community on April 15, convened in the Berlin Conference, where the Quintet comprising the African Union, United Nations, European Union, Arab League, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sought a civilian and humanitarian resolution to the conflict. The conference was much needed since the country is in dire need of international efforts, with over 14 million people having fled their homes, and famine aggravating the humanitarian situation. Given the internationalization of the war, with a multitude of countries supporting the warring parties, an international solution is apt.
That said, the government side — with its military and state apparatus increasingly subordinated to Islamists — will likely resist any non-Islamist intervention, along with any proposal for civilian-led transition. This reflects an effort to preserve radical Islamist dominance through the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood’s influence over the state. After nearly four decades of dominance, the Sudanese Islamist Brotherhood appears ready to continue its violent resistance.
The History of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood
The Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood has long embedded itself within state institutions, transforming them into instruments of ideological control and coercion. Its rise to power followed the 1989 National Islamic Front (NIF)-led coup that brought Omar al-Bashir to power, after which Hassan al-Turabi and his network entrenched Islamist influence across the military, security services, civil administration, and economy. Like today, Islamists employed a shadow state to avoid international scrutiny while still directing policy. These Islamist networks deepened ethnic and religious divisions, contributing to systematic violence against marginalized groups such as the Fur, Nuba, and Zaghawa. Although the 2019 overthrow of Bashir removed the National Congress Party from formal power, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood remained functionally intact. Instead of dissipating, it adapted, embedding its political and financial infrastructure within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to serve as a permanent veto against any democratic or peaceful settlement.
The persistence of Islamist power within the Sudanese government regime is most visible in the sustained influence of figures such as Ali Karti, Ali Osman Taha, Ahmed Haroun, and Osama Abdallah. Each exercises command over militias, political networks, and the integration of Islamist infrastructure into the SAF. The regime’s decision to release them from Kober prison in April 2023 was further proof of the mutual dependency of the Islamists and the regime.
It is thus unsurprising that the old regime and its Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), operating out of Port Sudan, have loudly opposed the Berlin Conference, which seeks to elevate Sudanese civilian actors as the foundation of a stable Sudan. In rejecting the conference, the Port Sudan government declared that “the problems and solutions for Sudan are determined by the Sudanese themselves only.” As the civil war grinds into its fourth year, the government and its SAF backers show every sign of preferring the status quo. By decrying the conference for its “disregard for the country’s sovereignty,” the Sudanese government seeks to undermine the Quintet’s efforts, deny it any meaningful role in shaping Sudan’s future, and sabotage any solution that the Berlin Conference can provide.
🇩🇪 🇸🇩 German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul on Wednesday said more than 1.3 billion euros ($1.5 billion) had been pledged for Sudan at an international aid conference in Berlin pic.twitter.com/C9k05tmjnW
— AFP News Agency (@AFP) April 15, 2026
Civilian Leaders Support a Civilian Resolution
In contrast, the civilian leaders, such as former Sudanese prime minister Abdalla Hamdok who now heads the Somoud coalition, welcomed the Conference’s focus on civilian actors. At the Berlin Conference, Hamdok joined around 50 civilian politicians and civil society leaders to discuss the foundations for a peaceful political transition. Similarly, a plethora of other civil society organizations, numbering in the hundreds, issued a joint open letter stating, “peace in Sudan cannot be achieved without the full participation of its people, because Sudanese civil society is organised, united in purpose, and ready to engage.”
The Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis), committed to an inclusive Sudan founded on secularism, democracy, and decentralization, expressed support for international mediation while raising concerns about the Berlin Conference’s participant list. It warned that some invitees lacked genuine political or popular legitimacy and instead operated as vehicles for the Islamist movement and its networks. Given that the SAF and its Islamist affiliates killed nine civilians in a drone strike during the conference week, fears surrounding their participation in any peace process is understandable.
The West must heed Tasis’ warning, especially given the stakes and the scale of funding involved. At the conference, the E.U. and member states pledged €812.14 million; if such resources fall into extremist hands, they will only deepen the conflict. While the Quintet has called for sidelining extremist Islamist groups – recognizing at least part of the danger they pose – it does not appear fully cognizant of the depth of Islamist entrenchment within Sudan’s regime and armed forces. Excluding Islamist-aligned actors and ensuring strict oversight of the funds should be central to the Quintet’s effort to advance a civilian-led transition plan for Sudan.
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