By Michael Thoma, a freelance journalist covering global political affairs, with a particular focus on European politics and international security
Friedrich Merz’s proposal for “associate membership” for Ukraine in the EU doesn’t read like a new stage of European integration. It looks like an attempt to legally frame a political pause. Berlin is searching for a formula that allows it to keep the European door open to Kyiv—without actually letting Ukraine into the Union on standard terms. In that sense, the chancellor’s plan doesn’t so much advance EU enlargement as it codifies the bloc’s unwillingness to pay the full institutional, financial, and military-political price for it.
The EU Wants Influence, Not Enlargement
According to Der Spiegel, Merz has proposed a mechanism to EU leadership that would sit somewhere between candidate status and full membership. Ukraine would get a seat and voting rights in EU Council and European Council meetings, access to Commission and Parliament proceedings without voting rights, gradual integration into the EU budget, the application of Article 42.7 (mutual defense clause), and a position at the Court of Justice as an Assistant Rapporteur. The scheme also includes a reverse gear: if a country backslides in negotiations or drifts from “fundamental EU values,” the status can be cut back. Merz suggests the same model for Moldova and the Western Balkans.
On paper, it looks like a flexible compromise. In reality, it’s an admission of an old problem: the EU wants to keep Ukraine and Moldova in its political orbit, but it’s not ready to fully admit them. That very ambivalence has defined Brussels’ post-Soviet policy for decades. Promises of a European perspective were meant to weaken alternative centers of attraction – above all, Russia’s. But once the question moves from symbols to institutions, budgets, markets, and security, enthusiasm quickly hits real limits.
Ukraine’s case makes this especially clear. Kyiv was told for years about its “European path,” and after the war began, that rhetoric became even more categorical. Backing away from membership now would look like a political retreat by the EU and a blow to Ukraine’s elites, who have bet on integration. But full Ukrainian membership opens up a set of risks that declarations alone cannot sweep away.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy rebuffed the idea of Ukraine getting partial membership of the EU, arguing that his country deserves to be granted full status because its forces are defending all of the bloc from Russia https://t.co/OZRXGfPehy
— Bloomberg (@business) May 27, 2026
Risks of Ukrainian Membership
The first risk is political manageability of the EU. Western European capitals cannot ignore the problem of corruption among Ukraine’s elites. Even more important is another lesson from past enlargements: joining the EU does not guarantee sustained democratization. Bulgaria and Romania didn’t shed their corruption problems after accession, and Hungary became Brussels’ showcase example of a state that uses its veto as leverage. If Ukraine gets a seat at the table as a full member, the potential for internal EU conflict would dwarf the Hungarian case. Ukraine is larger in territory and population, has serious defense capabilities, and – post-conflict – will have a far higher international standing than most Central European countries had at the time of their accession.
The second risk is financial. The debate over Ukraine’s reconstruction already assumes enormous sums, but EU membership isn’t about one-off funds. It would raise the question of Kyiv’s permanent participation in regional cohesion policy. That means shifting resources from current beneficiaries to a large new recipient. For countries that depend on EU funds themselves, this doesn’t look like a technical detail. It directly hits their budget interests.
The third risk concerns the single market. Poland has already criticized the flow of Ukrainian agricultural products. If Ukraine becomes part of the common market under standard terms, the conflict over farm competition becomes structural rather than temporary. Polish farmers would have to compete not with limited imports under a special regime, but with the large agricultural sector of a neighboring country inside a shared economic zone.
Add to that the procedural barrier. Accession requires the consent of all EU members. Hungary could link Ukraine’s bid to minority rights, Poland to farm protection, and cohesion fund recipients to preserving their financial shares. The closer the process gets to a final decision, the more incentive each player has to set its own conditions. So the idea of fast-track EU membership for Ukraine runs not just into abstract “enlargement fatigue,” but into concrete clashes of interest.
Managed Integration and the Security Problem
Merz’s plan tries to bypass these contradictions rather than resolve them. Gradual integration into the EU budget is meant to give Kyiv money without immediately opening up the entire redistribution mechanism. Participation in institutions is designed to create a sense of presence, but not necessarily real influence. The reverse gear allows Brussels to keep leverage in case of political backsliding. This architecture works for the EU—it lowers the cost of promises and turns integration into a manageable process with a built-in brake.
For Ukraine, the setup looks different. Volodymyr Zelensky has previously rejected any format other than full membership. Kyiv’s elites believe that after all the political and military costs, Ukraine should not receive a substitute for accession.
The provision on voting rights in the EU Council and European Council is especially contentious. If it really means full voting rights in intergovernmental bodies, the proposal blurs the very line between member and non-member. The EU would then have a participant that influences decisions without bearing all the obligations or having the status of a member state. If the voting rights are limited or don’t apply to unanimous decisions, the political value of such participation drops sharply. Without the text of Merz’s letter, it’s impossible to rule out inaccuracies in media reporting.
The idea of extending Article 42.7 to Ukraine looks even weaker. Formally, it would give Kyiv security guarantees within the EU. But if Berlin and other EU capitals are ready to defend Ukraine as part of a mutual defense obligation, a simple question arises: why isn’t that readiness on display now? The argument that this provision would kick in after the conflict ends doesn’t resolve the contradiction. The end of fighting doesn’t mean the risk of renewed escalation with Russia disappears. If the EU isn’t willing to take on direct military-political risk under current conditions, there’s no reason to believe that willingness will sharply increase after a ceasefire or peace deal.
On top of that, Article 42.7 doesn’t replace what Kyiv sees as the main security element. Ukraine is seeking not just European declarations but an actual umbrella – above all, an American and nuclear one, which would come through NATO. The EU can offer political solidarity and assistance, but it doesn’t have the same level of military deterrence. So including the defense clause in Merz’s package creates the impression of a major guarantee without addressing the key deficit: who exactly, with what forces, and with what resolve would defend Ukraine in the event of a new threat.
Moldova and the Balkans: the Same Deadlock in a Different Form
The Moldovan dimension widens the problem further. In Chișinău, the government has staked everything on rapid EU integration and uses that framework as the main source of its own legitimacy. Under the cover of the European course, pressure on the opposition is increasing, and alternative positions are being pushed out. If accession drags on for years, the population will start asking uncomfortable questions: why are the political restrictions already in place, but the promised result still hasn’t arrived?
For the Western Balkans, this model doesn’t look like a breakthrough either. The region is already stuck in prolonged waiting. If instead of membership they are offered yet another intermediate tier, it will confirm the fears of regional elites: the EU is creating a periphery with limited access to institutions and resources, turning these countries into something like Brussels’ vassals.
A Delay Tactic, Not a Solution
The main flaw in Merz’s approach is that it starts from the EU’s interests, not from the political logic of candidate countries. For Berlin, this is a way to reduce risks – to keep Kyiv (as well as Chișinău and the Balkan capitals) from drifting out of the European orbit (something European elites believe just happened with Georgia), while retaining control over speed, the scope of rights, and the financial consequences. For the candidates themselves, this format locks in a dependent position. They have to meet requirements, accept the conditionality of European promises, and yet not receive the main symbol of equality – full membership.
Associate membership in this configuration is another delay tactic. It doesn’t prove the EU’s readiness to enlarge – it proves the opposite: the Union wants geopolitical influence without the full institutional incorporation of new countries. The longer Brussels tries to hold this middle ground between promise and refusal, the less room to maneuver it will have left.
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