By Lyndon Li, freelance journalist who has authored articles for the Financial Times and Voice of America
A series of disruptions to subsea communications cables in European waters has exposed a growing vulnerability at the heart of the continent’s digital infrastructure. New research highlights concerns over the role of Chinese and Russian maritime activity and the persistent absence of a coordinated European response.
A recent report by the China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI), a UK-based research organization, documented 12 suspected undersea cable sabotage cases across Europe from January 2021 to April 2025. Of the 10 cases where vessels were identified, 8 are linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership. Two further cases involved ships with opaque ownership structures and irregular maritime behavior, raising questions about intent.
The report highlights a serious event that occurred in November 2024, when two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea — linking Lithuania to Sweden, and Finland to Germany — were severed. Data from commercial tracking services placed the Chinese-flagged Yi Peng 3 in close proximity to the cable routes at the time, with navigational patterns described by reports as “anomalous and consistent with seabed interference.” This incident followed an earlier significant event in October 2023, where the Chinese-flagged NewNew Polar Bear was implicated in damaging the Balticconnector gas pipeline and another data cable in the Baltic Sea.
While such incidents are sometimes attributed to accidental anchoring or fishing activity, the CSRI report argues that the frequency, clustering, and profiles of the ships involved are consistent with grey-zone activity: deliberate acts of disruption designed to remain below the threshold of armed conflict.
Submarine fiber-optic cables carry more than 99 percent of intercontinental data traffic, including financial transactions, military communications, and the flow of commercial and diplomatic information. Yet despite their criticality, these cables — and the vessels that install and maintain them — remain largely outside the scope of comprehensive EU security policy.
Few member states possess robust national maritime surveillance systems, and the European Union has yet to establish a cohesive framework for monitoring, protecting, or responding to incidents involving subsea infrastructure. The CSRI report characterizes this as a “strategic blind spot” in the bloc’s wider approach to resilience and deterrence.
👀Finland/Estonian undersea cable has been cut on Christmas. The Estlink Two is 1 of 2 cables connecting the Baltic power grid to Finland.🇨🇳ship Xin Xin Tiang crossed the cable at noon local time. This is the third time that a Chinese ship is suspected of involvement in cable cut pic.twitter.com/qPahmSUum1
— Theresa Fallon (@TheresaAFallon) December 25, 2024
The report also draws attention to China’s growing role in the global cable market. State-affiliated firms, including HMN Tech and China Telecom Global, have significantly expanded their presence in international cable laying and servicing — often submitting bids below market price. This has triggered scrutiny in regions like the Pacific, Africa, and South Asia, where geopolitical influence and commercial access increasingly overlap.
Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, all domestic entities are obliged to cooperate with state security services, adding a further layer of complexity to infrastructure partnerships. In previous instances, Western allies have blocked Chinese involvement in sensitive cable projects on national security grounds.
Within the EU, strategic infrastructure has received increased attention in recent years, particularly through legislation on foreign subsidies, cybersecurity, and critical entities. However, the comprehensive protection of undersea cables — and legal clarity around their status and the attribution of damage — remains underdeveloped.
The CSRI recommends a series of urgent measures, including integrated maritime domain awareness, updated legal definitions for cable sabotage, and structured cooperation with international partners such as Japan and Australia. Without such safeguards, the report concludes, Europe risks becoming vulnerable to strategic coercion — not through overt confrontation, but through calculated disruptions in the depths.
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