By Ruben Cober
European politics has been dominated by a single argument for years. Whenever the European Union fails to formulate a common position or approach, politicians, experts and commentators all echo the same message: Europe needs greater unity and solidarity. These are the magic words that the likes of Caroline de Gruyter and Arend Jan Boekestijn seize upon at every crisis or perceived threat to argue for more power to be given to the European project.
According to this view of the EU, it is not the problems themselves, but primarily the European response to them that is the problem. This narrative also prevailed in the Brussels bubble and the media following the crisis in Ceuta. It was not the weakness of the European external border or the fact that more than 70,000 migrants entered Spain illegally, but the lack of ‘solidarity’ that was said to be the most important lesson. Thus, according to the NOS, the Ceuta crisis demonstrated that European solidarity is fragile, after Italy had introduced border controls against travellers from Spain.
I wouldn’t blame anyone for no longer being able to keep track of the events in Ceuta. Initially, the media reported that there were ‘a few hundred’ migrants in Ceuta. Then, suddenly, the figure had risen to more than seventy thousand. Subsequently, it was reported that Spain had the situation under control and that most of the migrants had returned to Morocco. It is unclear how many migrants remain in Ceuta. On Friday, the Belgian broadcaster VRT spoke of at least 8,000 people. The images from the beaches are not getting any better.
Nevertheless, according to many journalists, EU experts and commentators, the problem was not Spain’s failure to secure its border, but the lack of solidarity from other EU countries. For example, Professor of EU law Merijn Chamon argued in De Standaard that, rather than supporting Spain and taking a firm stance towards Morocco, most EU Member States reacted ‘hysterically’.
But with whom, then, should the other EU countries have shown solidarity? After all, Spain did not accuse Morocco and, on the contrary, called on the other Member States not to criticise Morocco. Moreover, European Commission President von der Leyen described Morocco as a ‘strategic partner in combating illegal migration’.
What exactly was that solidarity supposed to entail? Strong press statements? Furthermore, the protection of national borders is a national responsibility in which the Spanish authorities have clearly failed. The European Union and the Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex merely provide support. For instance, the Spanish government is said to have ignored warnings from the intelligence services about an impending influx. Pedro Sánchez’s government therefore appears, above all, to lack solidarity itself – with its own people in Ceuta.
PLEASE CLICK HERE TO READ THE REST OF THE ARTICLE, WHICH HAS BEEN ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN DUTCH BY NIJMANSNIEUWSBRIEFJE.NL.
***
In July, on his Substack page, Ruben Cober published the following article on the same topic, which is being republished hereunder:
***
How Pedro Sánchez’s Spain became Europe’s weakest link
Breaking the European consensus yet facing little accountability
For years, European politics has been dominated by one recurring argument. Whenever the European Union struggled to speak with one voice on the world stage or couldn’t find a common position or solution, politicians, commentators and (so-called) experts stressed the need for European unity. “Europe is stronger together” is the biggest Brussels bubble platitude. In fact, Strength with Unity is even the slogan of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU.
They persistently made this argument, pointing to one man: Hungary’s former prime minister Viktor Orbán. Whether it was on migration, foreign policy, or the rule of law, Orbán was seen as the sole obstacle undermining European unity and blocking the other 26 EU countries from making progress. Countless articles warned that a single national government weakened Europe’s ability to act collectively. In this view, any leader whose positions and policies move against common European objectives deserves scrutiny.
Yet this standard has not been equally applied to everyone. Spain’s socialist prime minister Pedro Sánchez has become the clearest example. On issue after issue, his government is taking positions that go against the European consensus or even undermine it. But compared with Orbán, the criticism from Brussels, much of the European media and many policy experts have remained strikingly mute. The reason why could reveal a deeper problem at the core of European politics: whether the EU applies its principles consistently, or only when it is politically convenient.
Migration: Europe tightens borders, Spain opens doors
The first issue is migration. After a decade of political deadlock and lack of European coordination, the European Union finally agreed on the Migration and Asylum Pact in 2024. The ten new laws entered into force last month. The goal: improve consistency and coherence in migration policy, strengthen the EU’s external borders and finally establish a common European system for asylum.
But one part remained unsolved. Only around one in five migrants ordered to leave the EU actually leave. To change this, the European Parliament adoptedthe Return Regulation last month. This law makes the removal of people without legal residence – mostly rejected asylum seekers – faster and more effective. It also makes possible so-called return hubs: centres outside the EU where people can be detained and sent back from to their country of origin or another. After the vote, a broad majority of EU member states -19 of 27 – said they will take the lead in setting up these hubs.
But while Europe is finally moving towards a common system and focusing on increasing returns, Spain is moving in the opposite direction. Together with Macron, Sánchez was the only head of government critical of the new law and return hubs, calling them “absolutely inefficient” and “worthless.” Talking about inefficient: Spain has had the lowest return rate within the EU for years. In 2023,just 5995 people left Spain out of 64,260 who were ordered to leave
More importantly, Sánchez’s decision to launch Europe’s largest regularisation programme runs counter to the EU’s broader migration strategy. While Brussels is finally implementing a common asylum and migration policy designed to strengthen external borders and reduce incentives for irregular migration, Spain aims to grant residence and work permits to around 900.000 undocumented migrants by 2027.
But in a Schengen area with virtually no internal borders, migration policy is no longer purely a national matter. Decisions taken in Madrid have consequences for the rest of the European Union. Spain’s programme has already attracted around 1.2 million applications. Those who are granted residence permits will also gain the right to travel freely to other EU countries. More important still is the signal Spain’s programme sends. At the exact moment when the EU is trying to discourage irregular migration by making clear that illegal entry will not lead to permanent residence, one of its largest member states has launched the largest regularisation programme in European history.
This has made it considerably harder for the EU to present a coherent and credible common migration policy. Viktor Orbán was repeatedly criticised for undermining the EU’s common migration policy by refusing to implement asylum rules. Yet Spain’s move in the opposite direction has attracted far less criticism despite also undermining the EU’s collective approach.
China: Europe tries to reduce dependence, Sánchez calls Beijing an “ally”
Migration is not the only issue where Sánchez is going against a growing European consensus. Foreign policy is another, with Europe’s relations with China as the clearest example. Over the past few years, EU-China relations have fundamentally changed. European leaders increasingly see China not as a partner, but as an economic competitor and strategic rival.
That´s mainly because the EU-Chinatrade deficithas become the biggest in the world, at a staggering €359.8 billion in 2025. In part because of unfair Chinese competition and massive state subsidies, European manufacturers are struggling to compete with Chinese producers. This has contributed to Europe’s deindustrialisation, withover 500 manufacturing jobs lost per day. The result: Chinese monopolies and European bankruptcies.
As a result, even Germany, which has long been cautious because of its focus on increasing exports to China, is now calling for measures against unfair Chinese competition and for decreasing economic dependencies. The European Commission has introducedeconomic security measures to‘derisk’ the economic relationship, and more and more European countries are calling for further action.
And beyond trade lie growing (geo)political tensions, especially due to China’s ‘no limits partnership’ with Russia. Without Chinese support, Russia could not fight the war against Ukraineat this scale. Europe’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, has called China thekey enabler of the conflict, while Xi Jinpingrepeated his support to Putin last year.
Despite these huge economic and geopolitical challenges, Pedro Sánchez has repeatedly called China an ‘essential partner’ and even a ‘strategic ally. Less than three months ago, Sánchez said it was in the EU’s interest to have strong ties with China. Buena suerte con eso! China is even lobbying Spainto weaken down EU plans to boost EU industry. In short, when almost all European governments see China as an economic competitor and strategic rival, Sánchez is presenting Beijing as a partner.
Viktor Orbán used to beXi Jinping’s best friend in the EU, and he received a lot of criticism for it. When Xi Jinping visited Hungary in 2024, Le Mondedescribed Orbán as one of Beijing’s key allies in Europe, arguing that Xi was using Hungary to weaken a common European front on China. I struggle to find the same amount of critical articles on Sánchez’s relationship with Xi.
The same pattern can be seen in Europe’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Thedifferences between European countries in the bilateral military, financial and humanitarian aid they have provided since February 2022 are enormous. The obligatory platitudes from European politicians – “Ukraine is fighting our war,” “fighting for our values,” and “for our security”- are painfully hollow, because some leaders’ actions don’t match their words.
That definitely holds true for Sánchez. In 2023 he told Ukraine’s Parliament: “I wanted to tell you that we are and will be with you as long as it takes. I wanted to tell you that we will support Ukraine no matter the price to pay”. Yet it turned out that the price couldn´t be too high. At the end of 2025, Spain had provided just€1.47 billion or a meagre 0.117% of GDPin bilateral aid to Ukraine. This stands in stark contrast to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Denmark who have backed up their speeches with aid worth 1.8 to 2.3% of their GDP. For a government that repeatedly insists on European solidarity, the gap between rhetoric and reality is striking.
EU funds for pensions and corruption scandals
This lack of solidarity is all the more striking because Spain has together with Italy been the top receiver of money going from North to South in the form of the NextGenEU COVID Recovery Fund. Spain is entitled to €79.8 billion in grants and 22.6 billion in loans from the recovery fund, almost 15% of the fund’s amount. Nice money if you can get it!
In addition to being the biggest recipient, Sánchez’s government also emerged as the clearest misuser of the funds. In May, Spanish newspaper El Mundo reported that the Spanish government has used more than €10 billion in EU recovery funds for pensions and other social spending in 2024 and 2025. Separately, the Spanish Court of Auditors found that €2.4 billion of EU recovery funds had been used to top up pensions in 2024. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary was rightly criticised for the way it misused EU funds, and the European Commission rightly insisted that EU taxpayers’ money be properly protected. That same principle and scrutiny should apply to Sánchez’s Spain.
Staying on the topic of misusing funds, Sánchez’s government and his Socialist PSOE party have also been embroiled in a major corruption scandal since 2023. The most damaging is the so-called Koldo affair, which centres on allegations that senior PSOE officials and former ministers were involved in a corruption scheme linked to the purchase of face masks during the pandemic. Sánchez’s former transport minister, close ally and former PSOE organisation secretary José Luis Ábalos, has been convicted of corruption, bribery, misuse of public funds, and involvement in a criminal organisation, and has received a 24-year prison sentence.
Scandals have expanded to the Socialist party. Police raided the PSOE headquartersas part of an investigation into alleged attempts to obstruct judicial investigations and a possible illegal financing scheme. PSOE member Leire Díez is accused of exerting pressure on judges investigating corruption cases involving the party, with support of party officials. And another blow came with the investigation into former Socialist prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero over his alleged links to Venezuela and the airline Plus Ultra.
At the same time, Sánchez’s wife Begoña Gómez has faced charges including corruption in business dealings and misuse of funds over allegations that she used her position to advance private interests. Sánchez has not been charged, but the growing number of investigations involving his party, close allies and family has plunged the PSOE into its biggest corruption crisis in years.
If this all sounds Orbánesque to you, that is because parallels with Hungary are difficult to ignore. The cases are not identical, but they raise a similar question about accountability. European institutions and media were right to hold Viktor Orbán’s Hungary to account over allegations of corruption and misuse of funds. Yet that Sánchez’s government has used EU recovery funds for domestic spending, together with the widening corruption scandals surrounding his PSOE party, have prompted nothing of the same political or media reaction.
Pedro Sánchez’s Spain is not Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. But that is the point. The European Union should not judge governments by their political family or ideology, but by their actions. On migration, foreign policy, the use of EU funds and standards of political accountability, Sánchez’s government is going against the direction taken by much of the rest of Europe. Yet the response from Brussels, much of the European media and experts has clearly been more restrained than the reaction to Orbán. Common European principles lose their credibility when they are enforced unevenly. The real test of the European Union is not whether governments agree all the time, but whether they are judged by the same standards when they do not.
Disclaimer: www.BrusselsReport.eu will under no circumstance be held legally responsible or liable for the content of any article appearing on the website, as only the author of an article is legally responsible for that, also in accordance with the terms of use.
