No Safe Bets

How Europe Can Survive in an Age of Unreliable Partners

By Joshua Livestro, a member of the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs

“The United States will no longer tolerate economic relationships that undermine our technological dominance.” This blunt declaration from the Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy marks a turning point for Europe. The document explicitly states that “we will do so through the strategic use of tariffs and new technologies that favor widespread industrial production in every corner of our nation, raise living standards for American workers, and ensure that our country is never again reliant on any adversary, present or potential, for critical products or components.” In other words, the US is recalibrating its trade policy to prioritize American technological self-sufficiency—even if it means disrupting long-standing partnerships with allies like the EU.

This shift raises a critical question: how can Europe navigate a world where its largest trading partner is no longer a reliable ally in technology and trade? The EU talks of “technological sovereignty” as the answer, but that vision is decades away from being realized. In the meantime, Europe must figure out how to get there from where it stands today.

Here, Germany’s approach to foreign technology services and investment could serve as a useful case study in how the EU has learnt to deal with this dilemma. As Europe’s largest member state and its economic engine, Germany has developed a nuanced strategy to deal with a superpower like China, one that acknowledges both the risks and the necessities of cooperation.

Until the start of the pandemic, Germany embraced Chinese investments with almost naive optimism, convinced that economic ties with Beijing would yield mutual benefits and even political reform on the Chinese side (‘Wandel durch Handel’, change through trade). The shift in approach followed the growing realization that China’s ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative were not merely economic projects but tools of geopolitical leverage. It was a lesson Germany shared with other European member states after incidents like the 2021 blockade of Lithuanian exports.

The new, pragmatic strategy is marked by selective de-risking, tightened security requirements, and the shielding of critical infrastructure. The handling of the Chinese tech giant Huawei is a case in point. When Huawei first entered the German market, it was welcomed as a cutting-edge partner in the telecom sector, with policymakers hoping that economic integration would foster trust and mutual benefit. But as evidence mounted of China’s use of technology for state surveillance purposes and geopolitical leverage, Berlin’s approach hardened. Controversies like the exclusion of Huawei from core 5G networks and the 2026 phase-out deadline culminated in its 6G network plans, where the message is clear: no Chinese components allowed. The once-optimistic embrace of Chinese tech giants has given way to a sober calculus. Critical infrastructure must be shielded from any efforts to maintain economic ties.

Europe must apply a similar logic to its relationship with the US, though with one critical difference: the transatlantic bond is rooted in shared values like democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, that do not exist with China. This means any strategy of gradual disengagement must be longer-term, more measured, and fully reversible. Europe should begin by identifying its most critical technological dependencies (cloud infrastructure, AI, and defence systems) and work to reduce them over time, just as it has done with China. Clear red lines should be drawn to protect core European interests, such as ensuring no single foreign power, ally or not, controls any part of its essential infrastructure. Yet unlike with China, Europe must also preserve space for cooperation where interests align, recognizing that the US, for all its unpredictability, remains a partner in ways China never was.

The goal is not to sever ties but to create its own leverage and resilience, ensuring Europe is never again caught off guard by shifts in American policy. This approach demands patience and pragmatism, based on an acceptance of the fact that some dependencies will take decades to unwind. In a world where even allies can no longer be taken for granted, it is the only realistic path forward, balancing the necessity of cooperation with the imperative of sovereignty.