Democracy or drones – the EU’s security policy dilemma

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BrusselsReport.eu
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By Morten Jarlbæk Pedersen

It is neither a secret nor news that Europe’s security policy situation has changed both rapidly and drastically over the past few years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Americans’ increasingly clear distancing from Europe – and in the case of Greenland, even disrespect for the territorial integrity of the Kingdom – have shaken everything up.

And in the distance, China and India lurk, making the global playing field even more unpredictable. One expert has said that we are living in the age of pentarchy, which guarantees uncertainty, unrest and distrust when it comes to cooperation with others.[1]

All this also means that the political architecture that has been the framework for Europe’s foreign, security and defence policy for many decades is now being significantly challenged. NATO and the American defence guarantee are less credible than before, but there is currently no alternative. European countries, especially EU countries, are therefore left groping in the dark with an urgent and pressing need to reinvent a framework in which to act and from which to operate.

The arrow naturally points to the obvious choice: the European Union. Security policy, and the desire to ‘Europeanise’ security policy, thus occupy a great deal of attention in Brussels and the surrounding area.

There are two explanations for this: on the one hand, there is the obvious and acute need, which cannot immediately be met elsewhere, and on the other hand, there is a long-standing desire to promote ‘European autonomy’ through the EU.

The big question, however, is whether it is well thought out to point the arrow in that direction: Is the EU the right actor to handle the security and defence policy challenges of European countries in both the short and long term?

Pointing to the EU as a security policy actor raises a number of dilemmas, two of which will be briefly discussed below.

Firstly, there is a challenge in the Union’s institutional design and the ideas behind it: the EU is not at all built to be a security policy actor.

Secondly, there is an accompanying democratic dilemma: if the EU is to be transformed into a real actor in security and defence policy, this can only be achieved by making the Union less democratically based than it is today, which in itself would undermine the basis for conducting acredible security and defence policy.

The EU is a ‘regulatory state’

Although the EU has evolved in many ways over time, and although the federalisation of the union is today far more advanced than most people realise, the EU is still not a state in the traditional sense.

The crucial difference lies precisely in the area that is the subject of this article: foreign, security and, ultimately, defence policy. This is an area that is characterised by decisions rather than rules. The European Union, on the other hand, is an entity built on, with and by rules rather than decisions.

This distinction requires further explanation. Since its inception, the EU has been a market-defining and market-maintaining mechanism. A legal framework for the economies and markets of its member states.

In recent times, the EU has been called a ‘regulatory state’, which – understandably – is something other than a state in the classical sense.

And there is some truth in this. The EU is, more than anything else, a system of rules or a legal order. This means that the Union acts through rules, directives, regulations and the like. The EU creates the framework for the regulation of member states and, to an increasing extent, also their general actions in other policy areas.

But security policy is something else. Security and defence policy has very little to do with rules and systems. It is about immediate decisions: What line of negotiation should be taken?

What capabilities should be demonstrated? Ultimately: Where and how should troops be deployed?

Of course, security policy is not separate from everything else – industrial policy, for example, can also have a security policy dimension.

But security policy is ultimately about military capabilities, opportunities and will. A security policy that is not tied to a state’s willingness to implement this security policy with force is both meaningless and insignificant. Security policy is ultimately about where, when and under what conditions a country’s citizens will be called to arms.

This makes security policy radically different from, for example, the regulation of food transport, the energy efficiency of buildings or EU citizens’ access to unemployment benefits in Denmark.

And while the EU is both designed and more than capable of dealing with the latter, it seriously struggles with the former. The challenge lies in the very genetic code and constitutional structure of the Union, so the challenge is relevant regardless of whether we are talking about the urgent need for an alternative to American guarantees or the long-term political desire for ‘European autonomy’.

This means that the EU in its current form will find it incredibly difficult to pursue a genuine and credible security policy. Does the Council of Ministers or the European Commission call the shots? What role should the Parliament actually be given? What if the Member States disagree – which they very often do – in this area? Should a security policy directive or perhaps even a regulation be adopted to govern the security policy actions of the Member States if uniformity is to be ensured?

The questions – including the more curious ones – quickly arise.

The democratic dilemma

For many, the solution will be to rebuild the EU system: to give the Union the power and ability to make security policy decisions on behalf of the Member States. This is the solution that many in Brussels and the surrounding area are eager to implement – for example, by proposing that there should be majority decisions in the field of foreign and security policy or by proposing decisive military capabilities under the EU flag.

But this solution is not without its costs. It requires doing away with the restrictions that follow from the EU’s genetic code, as described above.

The dilemma is actually very simple: if the EU is to be able to pursue a credible security policy on behalf of all Member States, it must be de-democratised in the area of security policy. It must be willing – as with the regulation of food transport, the energy efficiency of buildings energy efficiency or EU citizens’ access to unemployment benefits in Denmark – to be outvoted by other countries’ representatives and still implement the decisions that have been made.

But security policy is, as mentioned, a special domain; security and defence policy decisions can ultimately cost the lives and limbs of those directly involved. Therefore , in a democracy, it requires a particularly strong legitimacy to be able to pursue this kind of policy.

 In the EU, effective security policy competence will in practice mean that the European populations must accept that other countries send their citizens into conflict and war.

A security policy union will therefore face the dilemma that it may be possible to make security policy decisions, but the democratic strength of these decisions would be limited, and this could jeopardise support for the entire union project as such.

Support that is already being challenged in several countries on the existing basis alone.

 

[1] Struwe. L.B. (2021) The balance of power in the world is changing, Ræson https://www.raeson.dk/2021/lars-bangert-struwe-magtbalancen-i-verden-er-i-forandring-en-varm-fred-vil-kendetegne-forholdet-mellem-5-stormagter/

 

Originally published in Danish for Danish think tank Prospekt. 

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